

Section 9: Global Valuation Chartbook (near) Record Cheap Equity Valuations

10th March 2022

Chris Watling, CEO & Chief Market Strategist, Longview Economics Email: <u>chris@longvieweconomics.com.</u>

Section 9: Valuation Overview

While absolute valuation has limited use for timing cyclical bull and bear markets (see structural asset allocation no 14, May 2006: "Does Valuation Matter"), it does provide insights into market sensitivities to challenging (or indeed positive) economic environments. Added to that, <u>relative</u> valuation can be particularly insightful – especially as a key building block for allocating between asset classes and geographies. This is why we dedicate a section of the quarterly global asset allocation to the analysis of valuation metrics.

Equities – Cheap Again

"De-risking" is the buzzword du jour on Wall Street, where hedge funds and their ilk are cutting positions, selling stocks and covering shorts. So-called degrossing activity in U.S. single stocks has climbed to the highest in a year, according to prime-broker data from Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

Source: Bloomberg news, 8th March 2022, LINK to article

Markets are obsessively focussed at this point on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Its impact on commodity prices and the associated SELL-off in equities, and other risk assets, has been dramatic. Not surprisingly 'de-risking' of portfolios has followed as investors have reacted to the changing situation (see quote above).




Fig 9: European Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less real bond yield)

Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



In various recent publications we have outlined the high levels of fears currently priced into these markets (and associated energy price risks). Key Longview market timing models, though, now have **some of their strongest BUY signals of the past decade.** Equally various commodity prices are up double, or even triple, digit percentages in only a few months (albeit many were off sharply yesterday). Whilst the conflict is ongoing, the risk of energy sanctions (and an associated further leg lower in equities) remains. The positioning of the models, though, highlights that this is likely the BUYing opportunity of 2022.

That message, importantly, is reinforced by the shift in equity market valuations over recent months. Whilst the market has been distracted by the conflict, **equities have become notably attractive relative to certain other asset classes.** Fig 9 above shows the equity risk premium for European equities. Rather than using a dividend discount model (which requires multiple assumptions about growth rates etc), we infer the ERP by deducting the real bond yield from the stock market's earnings yield (EY). The maths behind that assumption is laid out in a 2004 research publication (see structural Asset Allocation Research no. 2, June 2004: "EY – a Real Ratio", available on request).

The European stock market is now therefore offering as much value (relative to the bond market) as it was during the depths of the Euro crisis (fig 9). Real bond yields (RBY) have moved sharply lower since mid-February (as market participants have paid up for inflation protection). Equities have also, of course, fallen (=> higher EY). As such, the ERP (which measures the gap between EY & RBY) has widened significantly (currently ~10%).





Fig 9i: European (STOXX 600) PE ratio relative to US (S&P 500)


Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



The marked underperformance of European equities over the past 1 - 2 weeks has also further enhanced their valuation discount relative to US equities. Fig 9i shows the relative forward consensus PE ratios of the two key markets. Europe, on this measure, is now the cheapest it has been on record (i.e. data history starts in 1987).

In the UK the situation is similar. Relative to US equities, UK markets have been cheap for a while. Against UK government bonds (real yields), the UK equity market is now also, like the European one, offering close to a record risk premium (fig 9ii).







Even in the US markets (which remain somewhat expensive on stand-alone valuation metrics – see below), value for equities has appeared when measured against other asset classes (i.e. using relative valuation measures).


Fig 9iii below is a US equity risk premium, which looks at US equities relative to real cash rates (i.e. fed funds less inflation). Not surprisingly, given such high current inflation rates, equities have reached almost record attractive levels (relative to inflation adjusted cash rates). High current inflation rates, naturally, decrease the attractiveness of holding cash – and therefore reinforce the *relative* attractiveness of equities (given that companies, which generate the price increases, hold some natural 'inflation hedge' qualities). The situation is similar if we use inflation adjusted one year government bond yields. We do that to capture some of the future rate hikes which are already priced into the curve. Even using these higher yields, equities remain attractive on a relative basis (fig 9iv).








Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond






Stand-alone valuation metrics: Other measures of US equity market valuation, which use **stand-alone** valuation models (rather than relative ones), carry a different message. The table below shows the history of forward median PE ratios for various key US equity indices (using data back to 1999).



The red dots are the current median PERs. The grey bands are 'decile' bands, while the '*' are the long-term averages.

Of note, the PERs of most of the key US equity indices are still notably above historical averages and often in the top 1 or 2 deciles. The S&P600 (small caps) is the exception and the only index with a below average median PE ratio.


Table 9v: Median PE ratios (based on rolling 12m forward consensus EPS) shown with current, average & decile ranges (various US indices)



Other Valuation Observations

Other key points/extremes on valuation metrics of note include the following:

Fig 9vi: PE relative (India vs. China) shown against relative performance of their stock markets



• Indian equities are expensive relative to Chinese equities. That's the message of the relative forward PER of those two markets. As fig 9vi shows, that relative valuation has just reached +2 standard deviations (i.e.

LV

Longview Economics

India expensive relative to China). On the past three occasions that has occurred (including 2018/19 when the ratio was just shy of +2 standard deviations), Indian equities have suffered sustained underperformance over several quarters.

• **Commodities are cheap relative to equities:** Whilst commodities have rallied sharply, especially in recent weeks, on a relative price chart* they remain attractive relative to equities (fig 9vii). If our analysis is correct and we have recently started a new 'commodity super cycle', then we would anticipate a spike in coming years in the relative price of commodities vs. equities (equivalent to the spikes of 1974, early 1980s, 1990 gulf war and GFC – see fig 9vii). Naturally that can occur via both sharply lower equities and price spikes in commodities. NB Most commodity super cycles last 10 years or longer.




FIG 9vii: Commodities vs. equities (relative price*)

*The relative price chart is a proxy for relative valuation (albeit a poor one). It's calculated using the S&P500 GSCI total return commodities index vs. S&P500.

• Various commodities are expensive on a stand-alone basis: Despite that cheapness relative to equities, on a stand-alone basis (when deflated by CPI), various commodities are expensive relative to their own price history. Table 9viii shows the current price deflated by consumer price inflation and then placed into percentiles using the commodities own price history (and then also relative to all other commodities). On this approach, most of the precious metals, the base metals and the energy commodities are close to their highest 'inflation adjusted' prices on record (albeit that doesn't preclude them from making new all-time highs). Agricultural commodities are the key sub-group which remain notably below their record highs.



Table 9viii: Commodity Heatmap (all commodity prices deflated by CPI)

Commodity	Data since	Price	vs. own historv	vs. 1	vs. 2	vs. 3	$\frac{vs}{4}$	vs. 5	vs. 6	vs.	vs. 8	vs. 9	vs. 10	vs. 11	vs. 12	vs. 13	vs. 14	vs. 15	vs. 16
1. Palladium	2/1/1968	3,158.1	98		94	98	95	91	95	95	94	93	98	95	92	96	69	88	93
2. Gold	31/1/1901	2,049.8	96	6		99	88	61	63	92	93	61	96	89	66	97	о	41	67
3. Platinum	31/1/1910	1,155.2	55	2	1		9	2	2	76	71	14	72	77	13	76	0	2	35
4. Silver	31/1/1910	26.4	87	5	12	91		49	20	87	84	28	92	84	44	91		31	63
5. Brent Oil	1/10/1985	129.2	79	9	39	98	51		63	65	61	68	81	55	39	80	4	34	65
6. WTI Oil	31/12/1900	126.3	91	5	37	98	80	37		90	89	39	90	87	50	93	6	39	68
7. Wheat	31/1/1901	11.5	22	5	8	24	13	35	10		26	16	70	40	14	73	6	37	53
8. Corn	31/1/1901	7.5	26	6	7	29	16	39	11	74		19	82	60	16	79	1	46	67
9. Natural Gas	29/12/1922	4.6	85	7	39	86	72	32	61	84	81		85	84	50	86	27	43	59
10. Cocoa	1/7/1959	2,597.0	27	2	4	28	8	19	10	30	18	15		33	4	43	0	13	34
11. Cotton	29/8/1902	1.2	24	5	11	23	16	45	13	60	40	16	67		24	74	9	65	63
12. Copper	2/7/1959	4.7	84	8	34	87	56	61	50	86	84	50	96	76		90		36	67
13. Sugar	31/1/1901	0.2	19	4	3	24	9	20	7	27	21	14	57	26	10			20	26
14. Tin	9/2/2012	48,855.0	100	31	100	100	100	96	94	94	99	73	100	91	100	100		96	98
15. Zine	2/1/2004	4,115.5	89	12	59	98	69	66	61	63	54	57	87	35	64	80	4		57
16. Aluminium	27/8/1987	3,500.0	77	7	33	65	37	35	32	47	33	41	66	37	33	74	2	43	
These table should be read as t while those shaded green are c										ι.			Ŷ.						ry, bond

• Finally, **UK equities** are at notably **cheap levels** relative to US equities using both forward PERs and equity risk premiums (fig 9ix).





Fig 9ix: UK ERP relative to US (pp)

For a full update of our standard valuation models covering a range of asset classes and geographies, please see the appendix (pages 8 to 32). The implications of these valuation models will be assessed in the final published front section of this quarterly global asset allocation publication (due out later this month).



Section 9a: Headline Country PE ratios

Fig 9ai: Standalone **standard** PE ratios – various country indices (based on 12m forward EPS)



Source: Longview Economics, Bloomberg



Fig 9aii: Standalone **median** PE ratios – various country indices (based on rolling 12m forward EPS)

O New Zealand India United States Denmark Switzerland Portugal Belgium Ireland Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia Finland			15 * * * * * * * * * * * * *			30	35 26.8x 20.2x 20.0x 18.6x 18.5x 18.0x 17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.1x 17.1x
India United States Denmark Switzerland Portugal Belgium Ireland Thailand Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia							20.2x 20.0x 18.6x 18.5x 18.0x 17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.1x
United States Denmark Switzerland Portugal Belgium Ireland Thailand Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia							20.0x 18.6x 18.5x 18.0x 17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.1x
Denmark Switzerland Portugal Belgium Ireland Thailand Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia			•				18.6x 18.5x 18.0x 17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.1x
Switzerland Portugal Belgium Ireland Thailand Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia			•				18.5x 18.0x 17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.5x 17.1x
Portugal Belgium Ireland Fhailand Indonesia China Sweden Sweden Netherlands Australia			•				18.0x 17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.5x 17.1x
Portugal Belgium Ireland Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia			•				18.0x 17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.5x 17.1x
Belgium Ireland Ihailand Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia			•				17.9x 17.8x 17.5x 17.1x
Ireland Thailand Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia			•				17.8x 17.5x 17.1x
Fhailand Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia			•		_		17.5x 17.1x
Indonesia China Sweden Netherlands Australia			•				17.1x
China Sweden Netherlands Australia						<u> </u>	
Sweden Netherlands Australia	C		*	i	- :		- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Netherlands Australia			*				16.8x
Australia				:			16.5x
							10.5x
umanu :	:						
Malaysia	•				-		15.9x
France							15.6x
			*				15.5x
Philippines							15.3x
Canada						-	14.2x
Mexico							13.9x
Luxembourg							13.6x
Czech Republic		*					13.6x
Spain				!			13.4x
Japan			• *				13.3x
Гaiwan			•		:		13.1x
Singapore			•			÷	12.9x
United Kingdom			•				12.5X
Norway		*					12.5X
Germany	:		*		÷		12.3x
Peru		*					11.9x
South Korea							10.9x
Italy			* :				10.5x
Greece					:		10.4x
Hong Kong			:				10.3x
South Africa							10.2x
Chile		ė	*				10.2x
Brazil		•					10.1x
Poland	[•	*				9.7x
Austria							9.1x
Argentina				:			9.1x
Hungary							6.3x
Furkey		*:	:	-			4.6x
Pakistan				:			4.6x
Russia							•
	 Long te 		:	:	:	:	2.7X



	Data	Cu	rrent inde	x PE ratio	+ histori	cal perce	ntiles	(Current PE
	since o	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	
India	31/12/1998	-		*	ė		÷		20.0X
USA	24/11/1995	÷		*			÷	÷	18.9x
Switzerland	23/11/1993	÷		*		÷	÷	÷	16.1x
Sweden	23/10/1993	÷		*	÷		÷	÷	16.1x
World	23/10/1992	÷		*			÷	÷	16.0x
Australia	23/8/1992	:		*	÷		÷	÷	16.0x
Indonesia	23/8/1992	÷		*	÷		÷	÷	15.9X
Japan	23/6/1992	÷			*				14.5X
Canada	22/6/1992	÷					÷	÷	14.2X
Mexico	22/6/1990	÷		*			÷	÷	13.9x
Faiwan	22/5/1990			• *		÷	÷		13.1X
Europe	22/5/1989							÷	12.8x
Netherlands	22/3/1988			*			÷	÷	12.6x
Asia Ex-Japan	22/3/1988	÷		•			÷	÷	12.6x
France	22/3/1987			*		÷		÷	11.7X
Emeging Markets	21/2/1987			*				÷	11.4X
Germany	20/2/1987			*				÷	11.4X
Spain	19/2/1987			*			÷	÷	11.3X
ŪK	19/2/1987			*			÷	÷	11.1X
China	19/2/1987			*	÷				11.0X
BRICs	19/2/1987		0	i i				÷	10.6x
South Korea	19/1/1987							÷	10.6x
South Africa	19/1/1987						÷	÷	10.4X
LatAm	19/1/1987		• *				÷	÷	9.2x
Italy	18/1/1987			*	÷				8.9x
Brazil	12/1/1987		*	i i			÷	÷	8.1x
Furkey	2/1/1984	•	*				÷	÷	4.6x
Russia	1/1/1979		*	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		3.3x
Decile Bands	• Current P	'E Ratio	★ Long t	erm avera	ıge				
						Source: Lo	ngview Ed	conomic	s, Macrobon

Source: Longview Economics, Bloomberg



Fig 9aiv Cross-country PE heatmap

10/03/2022	Australia	Canada	France	Germany	ltaly	Japan	Netherlands	Spain	Sweden	Switze rland	United Kingdom	United States	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Korea	Mexico	Ru ssia	South Africa	Taiwan	Turkey	World	EM	BRIC	Asia Ex-Japan	LatAm	Europe	EMU	Emerging Europe	Average
Australia		11	1	1	1	1	12	12	31	33	1	60	12	22	77	56	26	27	1	9	11	5	42	10	15	18	7	3	4	3	18
Canada	90		12	14	1	9	40	24	71	69	6	87	32	40	92	83	62	63	2	30	32	8	54	51	53	47	25	27	23	3	40
France	100	89		36	1	24	89	69	97	98	29	101	46	62	99	93	75	73	8	55	52	23	89	67	75	68	44	98	79	11	64
Germany	100	87	65		6	18	80	69	99	100	53	101	51	60	100	98	85	71	9	63	56	27	100	77	73	80	50	88	81	13	68
Italy	101	100	100	95		64	97	100	100	101	98	101	68	81	101	100	97	94	15	91	81	33	101	94	96	97	70	100	100	20	86
Japan	100	92	77	83	37		81	79	98	100	72	100	59	68	100	99	97	74	16	72	82	30	100	93	83	95	60	87	85	24	77
Netherlands	89	61	12	21	4	20		30	81	81	9	90	37	50	89	76	65	57	4	31	38	17	63	52	63	48	31	31	25	5	44
Spain	89	77	32	32	1	22	71		85	92	25	97	45	57	93	81	63	65	5	45	45	20	80	59	62	59	42	58	47	7	54
Sweden	70	30	4	2	1	з	20	16		47	6	71	34	29	88	68	49	46	2	26	16	13	47	29	38	31	25	10	9	6	29
Switzerland	68	32	3	1	1	1	20	9	54		1	74	30	26	81	69	46	47	2	25	17	8	35	27	37	25	20	4	4	4	27
United Kingdom	100	95	72	48	3	29	92	76	95	100		100	47	68	96	98	81	81	8	59	55	22	93	72	76	74	44	96	77	10	68
United States	41	14	1	1	1	1	11	4	30	27	1		29	21	67	48	32	39	2	23	7	7	2	21	25	15	24	1	1	3	17
Brazil	89	69	55	50	33	42	64	56	67	71	54	72		54	91	89	78	78	4	64	55	20	68	66	76	67	44	61	58	7	59
China	79	61	39	41	20	33	51	44	72	75	33	80	47		92	85	70	66	9	56	50	10	70	64	67	65	45	48	46	3	52
India	24	9	2	1	1	1	12	8	13	20	5	34	10	9		41	10	14	1	8	4	7	16	6	4	5	9	6	6	5	10
Indonesia	44	17	8	3	1	2	25	20	33	32	з	53	12	16	60		17	22	1	9	3	9	31	8	16	14	9	13	13	6	17
Korea	75	39	26	16	4	4	36	38	52	55	20	69	23	31	91	84		48	3	33	12	16	56	28	39	37	19	34	31	9	35
Mexico	74	38	28	30	7	27	44	36	55	54	20	62	23	35	87	79	53		1	24	39	7	54	37	46	37	8	38	36	6	37
Russia	100	99	93	92	86	85	97	96	99	99	93	99	97	92	100	100	98	100		100	97	56	99	100	100	99	98	97	95	37	93
South Africa	92	71	46	38	10	29	70	56	75	76	42	78	37	45	93	92	68	77	1		38	13	64	51	66	49	21	57	47	6	52
Taiwan	90	69	49	45	20	19	63	56	85	84	46	94	46	51	97	98	89	62	4	63		23	86	72	63	80	44	62	57	13	60
Turkey	96	93	78	74	68	71	84	81	88	93	79	94	81	91	94	92	85	94	45	88	78		86	86	91	84	81	82	78	26	81
World	59	47	12	1	1	1	38	21	54	66	8	99	33	31	85	70	45	47	2	37	15	15		26	39	30	28	17	5	6	32
EM	91	50	34	24	7	8	49	42	72	74	29	80	35	37	95	93	73	64	1	51	29	15	75		60	63	17	43	41	7	47
BRIC	86	48	26	28	5	18	38	39	63	64	25	76	25	34	97	85	62	55	1	35	38	10	62	41		52	11	40	35	4	41
Asia Ex-Japan	83	54	33	21	4	6	53	42	70	76	27	86	34	36	96	87	64	64	2	52	21	17	71	38	49		27	45	38	8	45
LatAm	94	76	57	51	31	41	70	59	76	81	57	77	57	56	92	92	82	93	3	80	57	20	73	84	90	74		68	60	8	64
Europe	98	74	3	13	1	14	70	43	91	97	5	101	40	53	95	88	67	63	4	44	39	19	84	58	61	56	33		21	8	50
EMU	97	78	22	20	1	16	76	54	92	97	24	101	43	55	95	88	70	65	6	54	44	23	96	60	66	63	41	80		10	56
Emerging Europe	98	98	90	88	81	77	96	94	95	97	91	98	94	98	96	95	92	96	64	95	88	75	95	94	97	93	93	93	91		91
Average	83	61	37	33	15	24	57	47	72	74	33	84	42	49	91	84	66	64	8	49	41	20	69	54	60	56	37	51	45	10	


On a relative valuation basis (i.e. using forward PE ratios) compared with other indoes since 1980 (data permitting) and then scored by percentile, Turkey is the world's cheapest major equity market. India is them or expensive by this metric. NB this table should be read as 'column header' relative to 'row header' - i.e. Australia is inits 90th most expensive percentile relative to Canada (com pared to history).

Source: Longview Economics, Bloomberg



Section 9b: Standalone PE ratios of certain expensive/cheap countries

Fig 9bi: S&P500 12m forward PE ratios (based on rolling consensus EPS)







Fig 9bii: Australia forward PE ratio (based on rolling consensus EPS)

Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond




Fig 9biii: Chinese 12m forward PE ratios (based on rolling consensus EPS)



Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond


Fig 9biv: Japan 12m forward PE ratio (based on rolling consensus EPS)



Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



Section 9c: Various country PER relative to global PER (both on forward EPS)





Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond




Fig 9cii: European 12m forward PE relative to global 12m forward PE

Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond











Fig 9civ: India 12m forward PE relative to global 12m forward PE





Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond












Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



Section 9d: US Equity Risk Premia







Fig 9dii: US Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less real cash rates)




- US Equity Risk Premium (%) - Long-term mean - +/-1 std dev - +/-2 std devs


Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



Fig 9diii: US Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less IG corp bond yield)











Section 9e: UK Equity Risk Premia






Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond

Fig 9eii: UK Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less real cash rates)



Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond







Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond

Section 9f: European Equity Risk Premia





Fig 9fi: European Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less real bond yield)

Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



Fig 9fii: European Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less real cash rates)



Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond





Fig 9fiii: European Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less HY corp yield)

Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



Section 9g: EM Equity Risk Premia








Fig 9gii: EM Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less real cash rate)



Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond




Fig 9giii: EM Equity Risk Premium (earnings yield less real corp bond yield)



Section 9h: US Corporate Bond Spreads

Due to the asymmetric nature of bond spread series, we have used a median & quartile analysis instead of mean & standard deviation analysis.









Fig 9hii: US high yield corporate bond spreads over treasuries (bps) vs. VIX








Fig 9hiii: US investment grade corporate bond spreads over treasuries (bps)



Section 9I: Euro zone Corporate Bond Spreads











Fig 9Iii: EZ investment grade corporate bond spreads over bunds (bps)




Section 9k: Emerging Market Bond Spreads











Section 91: Shiller PE ratios

Fig 9li: Long term US S&P 500 cyclically adjusted (Shiller) PE ratio






Fig 9lii: Long term UK FTSE All-Share cyclically adjusted (Shiller) PE ratio







Section 9m: Earnings

Fig 9mi: US earnings (EPS) relative to long-term trend







Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



Section 9n: Global Sector Valuations

NB these tables are extracts from our global sector presentation. We also have presentations centric to US and UK markets. If you would like to be added to our monthly distribution list for any of these products, please let us know.

09/03/2022 08:39	Cons disc.	Cons staples	Energy	Financials	Healthcare	Industrials	Info tech	Materials	Comm. Services	Utilities	Index
Cons disc.		15	2	8	20	21	69	6	50	81	18
Cons staples	86		6	18	33	66	82	17	71	94	64
Energy	99	95		96	97	99	96	96	95	100	99
Financials	93	83	5		73	89	81	42	77	98	90
Healthcare	81	68	4	28		74	80	30	79	97	75
Industrials	80	35	2	12	27		73	7	62	90	41
Info tech	32	19	5	20	21	28		16	41	61	26
Materials	95	84	5	59	71	94	85		83	99	90
Comm. Services	51	30	6	24	22	39	60	18		70	34
Utilities	20	7	1	3	4	11	40	2	31		7
Index	83	37	2	11	26	60	75	11	67	94	

Fig 9ni: Global sector valuation heatmap*

Source: Bloomberg Consensus Estimates, S&P, Longview Economics

I

* NB This table should be read as 'columns versus rows' – i.e. the sector name above, relative to the sector name to the left.

Name	Forward PE	Long Term Mean	Relative PE			Relative PE	56-day RSI***	56-day RSI Percentile**
			PE	PE range	value	Percentile**		Percentile
S&P GLOBAL 1200 INDEX	15.4	15.8	-	-	-	-	40.1	-
Energy	8.9	14.7	0.58	0.63-1.50	-38.0%	2	63.9	53
Materials	11.6	14.3	0.75	0.50-1.28	-18.0%	11	46.3	10
Industrials	16.6	16.5	1.08	0.77-1.42	32.4%	68	40.5	27
Consumer Discretionary	17.4	16.6	1.13	0.62-1.41	1.2%	51	36.8	25
Consumer Staples	19.0	20.8	1.23	1.09-2.43	-5.5%	33	40.6	33
Healthcare	15.8	17.5	1.03	0.79-1.49	-7.2%	27	43.5	70
Financials	10.7	12.5	0.69	0.51-0.98	-13.5%	12	40.7	37
Info Tech	20.4	19.8	1.33	0.90-1.99	7.4%	74	41.3	84
Telecoms	16.0	16.1	1.04	0.61-1.79	4.4%	67	37.2	47
Utilities	18.0	14.1	1.17	0.49-1.35	27.8%	97	49.7	22

Fig 9nii: Global sector valuation metrics*

T

* This measures how expensive the sector is relative to the index, compared to its long term history (i.e. since 1987).

LV Longview Economics

Investments. Trades. Macro.

Fig 9niii: Global sector valuation (PE) heatmap

S&P 500 Sector	fwd pe	vs. own	vs.		vs.	vs.	vs.	vs.						
	ratio (x)	history	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Index
1. Energy	12.4	36		25	8	2	7	35	11	11	31	5	29	2
2. Materials	15.5	52	75		11	7	11	63	9	13	61	8	33	8
3. Industrials	19.3	83	92	89		8	50	85	70	25	94	42	64	49
4. Consumer Discretionary	28.2	92	98	93	92		89	92	91	59	93	79	86	92
5. Consumer Staples	21.2	90	93	89	50	11		100	65	33	97	36	61	30
6. Healthcare	15.3	32	65	37	15	8	0		12	9	52	4	28	9
7. Financials	14.5	83	89	91	30	9	35	88		33	88	33	60	19
8. IT	23.6	76	89	87	75	41	67	91	67		99	60	75	75
9. Communications	18.1	52	69	39	6	7	3	48	12	1		4	29	2
10. Utilities	19.0	93	95	92	58	21	64	96	67	40	96		75	62
11. Real Estate	20.5	89	71	67	36	14	39	72	40	25	71	25		48
Index	19.7	82	98	92	51	8	70	91	81	25	98	38	52	

These table should be read as the row header relative to the column header. Cells/Rows shaded red are more expensive on a percentile basis relative to history, while those shaded green are cheap on that relative basis.

Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond

S&P 500 Sector	fwd ERP (%)	vs. own history	vs. 1	vs. 2	vs. 3	vs. 4	vs. 5	vs. 6	vs. 7	vs. 8	vs. 9	vs. 10	vs. 11	vs. Index
1. Energy	8.6	82		64	77	92	77	58	85	74	61	84	65	83
2. Materials	6.9	85	36		83	90	75	42	92	81	29	88	61	92
3. Industrials	5.7	60	23	17		80	38	20	72	68	7	59	35	55
4. Consumer Discretionary	4.0	37	8	10	20		16	13	28	57	6	36	20	22
5. Consumer Staples	5.2	64	24	26	62	84		12	76	69	5	71	40	79
6. Healthcare	7.0	78	46	62	85	92	92		88	85	29	95	66	89
7. Financials	7.4	55	16	8	28	72	25	16		57	10	55	32	48
8. IT	4.7	46	34	27	41	51	39	19	51		1	48	26	39
9. Communications	6.0	80	39	71	93	94	95	71	90	99		95	62	97
10. Utilities	5.8	47	16	12	41	64	29	10	45	60	5		24	41
11. Real Estate	5.4	74	35	39	65	80	60	34	68	76	38	76		57
Index	5.7	61	18	10	47	79	22	14	53	69	3	60	43	

Fig 9niv: Global sector equity risk premium heatmap

ERP is the Equity Risk Premium (Earnings Yield less real bond yield) These table should be read as the row header relative to the column header. Cells/Rows shaded red are have a lower risk premium on a percentile basis relative to history, while those shaded green have a higher ERP on that relative basis. Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond



Fig 9nv: Global sector dividend yield heatmap

S&P 500 Sector	fwd div yield (%)	vs. own history	vs. 1	vs. 2	vs. 3	vs. 4	vs. 5	vs. 6	vs. 7	vs. 8	vs. 9	vs. 10	vs. 11	vs. Index
1. Energy	3.5	83		88	90	92	79	86	80	76	88	87	87	91
2. Materials	2.0	21	12		78	91	43	51	40	64	94	65	68	83
3. Industrials	1.6	14	10	22		96	11	15	31	47	95	36	28	53
4. Consumer Discretionary	0.7	6	8	9	4		6	6	10	11	57	17	21	12
5. Consumer Staples	2.5	36	21	57	89	94		67	53	55	93	69	59	95
6. Healthcare	1.7	20	14	49	85	94	33		57	46	94	55	58	88
7. Financials	2.0	44	20	60	69	90	47	43		56	89	64	65	87
8. IT	0.9	34	24	36	53	89	45	54	44		51	49	40	55
9. Communications	0.9	6	12	6	5	43	7	6	11	49		6	7	7
10. Utilities	3.3	9	13	35	64	83	31	45	36	51	94		60	68
11. Real Estate	2.9	15	13	32	72	79	41	42	35	60	93	40		75
Index	1.5	8	9	17	47	88	5	12	13	45	93	32	25	

These table should be read as the row header relative to the column header. Cells/Rows shaded red have a lower yield on a percentile basis relative to history, while those shaded green have a higher yield on that relative basis. Source: Longview Economics, Macrobond

Fig 9nvi: Global sector price to book heatmap

S&P 500 Sector	fwd pb	vs. own	vs.											
	ratio (x)	history	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Index
1. Energy	2.1	66		38	22	14	16	37	41	13	43	23	23	11
2. Materials	2.9	74	62		21	16	20	30	44	10	35	30	18	14
3. Industrials	4.7	93	78	79		7	72	76	70	5	84	85	62	61
4. Consumer Discretionary	8.4	92	86	84	93		85	92	86	46	88	92	89	84
5. Consumer Staples	5.9	92	84	80	28	15		70	66	9	64	75	56	10
6. Healthcare	4.2	78	63	70	24	8	30		50	6	64	61	33	8
7. Financials	1.6	64	59	56	30	14	34	50		9	59	57	49	8
8. IT	8.9	93	87	90	95	54	91	94	91		96	93	90	92
9. Communications	3.4	81	57	65	16	12	36	36	41	4		59	36	11
10. Utilities	2.0	88	77	70	15	8	25	39	43	7	41		19	18
11. Real Estate	4.0	93	77	82	38	11	44	67	51	10	64	81		27
Index	4.1	96	89	86	39	16	90	92	92	8	89	82	73	
These table should be read as the row basis relative to history, while those sh											-		-	centile acrobond

LV Longview Economics

Investments. Trades. Macro.

Section 90: Global Commodities Valuations

Fig 90i: Commodities heatmap

Commodity	Data since	Price	vs. own historv	vs.	vs. 2	vs. 3	vs. 4	vs. 5	vs. 6	vs.	vs. 8	vs. 9	vs. 10	vs. 11	vs. 12	vs. 13	vs. 14	vs. 15	vs. 16
1. Palladium	2/1/1968	2,924.0	98		94	-	95	91	95	95	94	93	98	95	92	96		88	93
2. Gold	31/1/1901	1,991.4	96	6		99	88	61	63	92	93	61	96	89	66	97	0	41	67
3. Platinum	31/1/1910	1,075.7	55	2	1		9	2	2	76	71	14	72	77	13	76	0	2	35
4. Silver	31/1/1910	25.8	87	5	12	91		49	20	87	84	28	92	84	44	91		31	63
5. Brent Oil	1/10/1985	112.0	79	9	39	98	51		63	65	61	68	81	55	39	80	4	34	65
6. WTI Oil	31/12/1900	110.6	91	5	37	98	80	37		90	89	39	90	87	50	93	6	39	68
7. Wheat	31/1/1901	10.7	22	5	8	24	13	35	10		26	16	70	40	14	73	6	37	53
8. Corn	31/1/1901	7.3	26	6	7	29	16	39	11	74		19	82	60	16	79	1	46	67
9. Natural Gas	29/12/1922	4.6	85	7	39	86	72	32	61	84	81		85	84	50	86	27	43	59
10. Cocoa	1/7/1959	2,624.0	27	2	4	28	8	19	10	30	18	15		33	4	43	0	13	34
11. Cotton	29/8/1902	1.2	24	5	11	23	16	45	13	60	40	16	67		24	74	9	65	63
12. Copper	2/7/1959	4.6	84	8	34	87	56	61	50	86	84	50	96	76		90		36	67
13. Sugar	31/1/1901	0.2	19	4	3	24	9	20	7	27	21	14	57	26	10			20	26
14. Tin	9/2/2012	44,305.0	100	31	100	100	100	96	94	94	99	73	100	91	100	100		96	98
15. Zinc	2/1/2004	3,919.5	89	12	59	98	69	66	61	63	54	57	87	35	64	80	4		57
16. Aluminium	27/8/1987	0,00	77	7	33	65	37		32	47	33	41	66	37	33	74	2	43	
These table should be read as th while those shaded green are ch										ι.									^{ry,} bond



This Publication is protected by U.K. and International Copyright laws.

All rights are reserved. No license is granted to the user except for the user's personal use. No part of this publication or its contents may be copied, downloaded, stored in a retrieval system, further transmitted, or otherwise reproduced, stored, disseminated, transferred, or used, in any form or by any means, except as permitted under agreement with Longview Economics Ltd.

This publication is proprietary and limited to the sole use of Longview Economics' clients and trial subscribers. Each reproduction of any part of this publication or its contents must contain notice of Longview Economics' copyright. This agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with U.K. Copyright law and the parties hereto irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts in respect of any dispute or matter arising out of or connected with this Agreement.

Any disclosure or use, distribution, dissemination or copying of any information received from Longview Economics Ltd. is strictly prohibited, whether derived from the reports or from any oral or written communication by way of opinion, advice, or otherwise with a principal of the company; and such information is not warranted in any manner whatsoever; and is for the use of our clients and trial subscribers only. Longview Economics Limited will not be liable for any claims or lawsuits from any third parties arising from the use or distribution of this document. This report is for distribution only under such circumstances as may be permitted by applicable law.

This publication is for your information only and is not intended as an offer, or a solicitation of an offer, to buy or sell any investment or other specific product. The analysis contained herein is based on numerous assumptions. Different assumptions could result in materially different results. Certain services and products are subject to legal restrictions and cannot be offered worldwide on an unrestricted basis and/or may not be eligible for all investors. All information and opinions expressed in this document were obtained from sources believed to be reliable and in good faith, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to the accuracy or completeness. All information and opinions as well as any prices indicated are current as of the date of this report, and are subject to change without notice. Some investments may not be readily realisable since the market in securities is illiquid and therefore valuing the investment and identifying the risk to which you are exposed may be difficult to quantify. Futures and options trading is considered risky. Past performance of an investment is no guarantee of its future performance. Some investments may be subject to sudden and large falls in values and on realisation you may receive back less than you invested or may be required to pay more. Changes in foreign exchange rates may have an adverse effect on the price, value or income of an investment. We are of necessity unable to take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situation and needs of our individual clients and we would recommend that you take financial and/or tax advice as to the implications (including tax) of investing in any of the products mentioned herein.

Longview Economics Ltd. is an appointed representative of Messels Limited. Messels Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.